Abstract-While networks have become ubiquitous, fast, and cheap, the carriers and vendors face serious challenges in making networks more reliable and secure. Rapid technical evolution, market pressures, and complexity have contributed to large outages in both data and voice networks in the USA. The unreliable deployment and operation of otherwise fault-tolerant communication technologies and architectures are causing severe disruptions to thousands of users and enterprises. Network reliability growth is difficult in an environment that bundles rapidly emerging services and concentrates infrastructure to realize economies of scale.
I
T IS OFTEN easier to predict failures than it is to change underlying processes that affect future failure trends. It is easier to focus on making systems more reliable through fault-tolerant techniques, than it is to understand why fault-tolerant designs fail in spite of our considerable effort and ingenuity. It is difficult to concentrate on the socio-economic reasons for system failure, and to incorporate those into our improvement efforts. These problems certainly apply in network reliability, where each network is geographically dispersed, uniquely configured and interfaced, and distinctly operated and managed. This discussion of network reliability is based upon the assumptions: • The cost of long distance telephone calls has dropped dramatically.
• The speed of information transfer across the Internet has made practical such applications as the World Wide Web.
• Economies of scale and relaxed regulatory environments are setting the stage for a huge competitive war: bundled service offerings providing "one-stop-shop" kiosks for telephone, Internet access, paging, and video entertainment services. However, we are often reminded that some of these information transfer attributes are at cross-purposes:
• Fast, realized by speedier computers and higher bandwidth connections, is not always inexpensive.
• Ubiquitous access complicates security and often makes systems more vulnerable.
• Cheap is not always reliable, because reliability requires investment in fault tolerance, personnel training, disaster recovery planning, and testing.
In fact, in quick-to-market competitive settings, it is often reliability and security that take a back seat to ubiquitous, cheap, and fast. Why? Because the enabling technological advances, although truly remarkable, have resulted in complex networks deployed over larger geographic areas, which are increasingly difficult to engineer, test, and manage incrementally.
0018-9529/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE III. LARGE-SCALE DATA NETWORK OUTAGES MCI Worldcom's data network misfortune of early 1999 August offers a good example of how difficult a balancing act it is to address network reliability adequately. Their frame relay network, used by companies such as Internet access providers and financial institutions and retail stores (often for mission critical transport of business information), suffered an outage lasting over 8 days [2] . The outage "caused the Chicago Board of Trade to halt electronic trading, …, and disrupted high-speed service for nearly 30% of MCI's global data network customers." In addition, thousands of automatic teller machines were impacted, and customers in New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco were affected [3] . Also, about 10% of America OnLine customers were affected by the outage [1] . The outage, ostensibly caused by vendor (Lucent) software and hardware upgrades to the frame relay switches, affected many users for a sustained period of time and resulted in appreciable embarrassment for the carrier. For some customers the problems were intermittent, while for others the outage was complete and lasted days [6] . Lucent undoubtedly spent enormous effort in designing and testing the new software upgrade. But when is enough testing enough? Can a vendor truly test every possible contingency that might arise in a large, complex, dispersed, operational network? How does a carrier, such as MCI Worldcom, ensure that vendor upgrades are adequately tested for the unique operational profile of the MCI Worldcom network? How does MCI Worldcom insure that its personnel are totally trained to transition major network upgrades? How do the customers of such a service insure that MCI takes adequate precautions in the future? What contingencies do the customers have in place to ensure continuity of their safety and business processes in the event of a loss of MCI Worldcom service? These are difficult questions, but carriers, service providers, vendors, and users must address them.
Rest assured, MCI Worldcom and Lucent are not alone in facing these issues. A somewhat similar outage was experienced in AT&T's data network in 1998 April involving Cisco equipment. The entire network was disrupted for 22 hours due to a combination of inadequate procedures and flawed software used during a network upgrade. The updated software caused massive amounts of administrative messages to disrupt the network completely [5] .
IV. LARGE-SCALE TELEPHONE NETWORK OUTAGES
Serious outages are not limited to data networks. A USA federal advisory committee of the FCC, NRIC, commissioned industry studies that found that "procedural error induced largescale telephone outages" are increasing, while nonprocedural outages are decreasing [4] , [7] . These errors might be related to under-investment in personnel, be it salaries to attract the required skills or in the training necessary to insure that rapidly deployed technologies are supportable. An equally plausible hypothesis is that these errors might relate to complexity, wherein all possible interactions in an operational environment are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to foresee.
Large-scale telephone outages have been tracked and analyzed for over 8 years. The frequency of outages that affect over 30 000 subscribers for at least 30 minutes has been fairly constant over this period (about 14 incidents per month), in spite of considerable effort to develop, promote and promulgate "best practices." In many instances, examinations of outage show that best practices are not always followed [4] . One approach is to accept blithely the notion of an HHP; another approach is for carriers to make it an engineering goal to decrease the trend. Over the past several years, numerous papers have appeared in this IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY which analyze the fault tolerance of SS7 networks necessary to control telephone services and networks. However, these models and the recommended deployment, call for local switches to have diverse connections to the SS7 network. Numerous outages involve instances where these "A-links" are dutifully deployed over different circuits, but in the same fiber, the same cable, or in the same conduit! In these instances, a fiber-cut renders the switch incapable of processing calls. Also in this TRANSACTIONS, numerous papers have dealt with SONET faulttolerant counter rotating rings. Here too there are multiple instances where both sides of such fault-tolerant rings are deployed in the same cable or conduit, or where a component has failed but was never replaced, thereby insuring an outage at the second component failure or a fiber cut! As another example, consider the triple redundancy of power for communications facilities:
• commercial AC power, • backup AC generators,
• an 8-hour battery backup if there is a dual AC power failure. One outage involved loss of power under this scenario: 1) Lightning caused a loss of commercial AC power.
2) The same lightning strike damaged the AC generator.
3) The alarm system to this un-staffed facility was either not enabled or not tested after installation. 4) After 8-hours the entire facility went down when the batteries were depleted. After 8 years of constancy, one wonders if the large-scale outage frequency is simply at an acceptable rate to carriers. The consequences of these outages are nontrivial, because over 20 million subscribers are impacted each year. About 70% of these outages are experienced by ILEC, where there is little or no competition.
V. NETWORK RELIABILITY CHALLENGES
Network infrastructure and operation are rarely static. Users are added and subtracted. New service or management capabilities and equipment are incorporated. It stands to reason that like many systems, there is a chance for reliability growth or deterioration. In fact, networks are more prone to failure whenever there are:
• Rapid deployments of new products and services into network infrastructures.
• Software upgrades to widespread indigenous pieces of equipment in large-scale network infrastructures.
• Deficits in network management tools to operate and maintain increasingly complex systems. In such environments, to err is human because of:
• Inadequate installation or operator instructions.
• Lack of necessary skills, training, or tools to help manage complexity.
• Design errors not identified by adequate pre-release testing.
• Deployment errors that defeat fault-tolerant designs. Somewhat similar patterns have occurred before. In the early 1990s the introduction of a new signaling architecture into the public telephone network resulted in a flurry of outages that crippled service for millions of subscribers. The problems were traced to newly introduced SS7 and inadequate testing of new software versions. The good news is that Duane's learning curve was alive and well, and the outages due to signaling decreased. However, now the stakes are much higher, as future network outages might affect all provided bundled services. Imagine failures that not only affect your telephone, but also your Internet access, paging capability, and TV programming.
An economist's view might be that in such an environment, inefficiencies will eventually be driven out of the market. If a vendor or carrier delivers fast and cheap, with not enough emphasis on secure and reliable, the market will eventually penalize that offering. However, achieving this equilibrium is a difficult tradeoff for network service offerers for two reasons:
1) The benefits of increased costs for reliable networks are difficult to quantify. Carriers and vendors struggle mightily with a difficult tradeoff. Over-invest and you are not competitive; under-invest, reactively respond when a calamity strikes, and loose market-share. 2) Not only are networks more complex, each is also unique in its setting and content, making carrier's and equipment vendor's job all the harder. In a complex setting, with a system consisting of many carriers and vendors, it is simply easier to make mistakes. One thing for sure: care will have to be taken to ensure that the deployment of rapidly evolving technological advances does not outstrip the ability to engineer, test and operate them properly.
For network reliability, it is time to look beyond the usual reliability algorithms, models, and statistics. We must also somehow include in our reliability rubric:
• ALWAYS -the common-cause environment in ALL reliability analyzes (avoid the simple-minded reliability models), • an exact, complete list of the assumptions we make in creating our reliability models (avoid misleading ourselves and others), • the rapid evolution of networking technology, • the pressures to introduce and bundle services quickly, • the sheer complexity of what we have wrought. Either those, or we have to leave it up to the economists.
